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NOTES.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-SEARCHES AND SEIZURES-RETURN Op
PAPERS UNLAWFULLY TAKEN-What has long been deemed one of

the most sacred and jealously guarded rights of English-speaking
people is the inviolability of their homes from illegal intrusions by
officials of the government. This right is guaranteed to the people
of the United States by the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution,
which provides that:
"The right of the people to be secure, in their persons, houses,
papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures shall
not be violated; and no Warrant shall issue, but upori probable
cause supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing
the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized."

(67)
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This right is now firmly and unquestionably established, but
the courts have not always been consistent in applying it to individual cases. At times there has been a seeming tendency to interpret this amendment broadly; at others, the interpretation has been
extremely narrow and restricted, with the result that some degree
of confusion has arisen as to the actual state of the law.
Although many cases had arisen in the State courts under similar provisions in State constitutions, the Supreme Court was not
called upon to construe, in an important case, this amendment to
the Federal Constitution until 1885, when the case of Boyd v. United
States I came before it for adjudication. In that case the question
arose as to the constitutionality of an Act of Congress authorizing a
court of the United States on motion of the government attorney,
in proceedings other than criminal, arising under the revenue laws,
to require the defendant or claimant to produce in court his private
books and papers on pain of having the allegations stated in the
motion taken as confessed.2 The court, in-an elaborate opinion by
Mr. Justice Bradley, concluded that this act was void as being in
contravention of the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution.
In its decision the court construed that amendment very
broadly, being no doubt greatly infldenced by the experience of the
Colonies prior to the Revolution. The fear of the arbitrary exercise of power restrictive of individual liberty by executive officials
of the government, was a strong incentive to a broad interpretation
of the provisions safeguarding personal privileges and immunities.
The court refers to the case of "Entick v. Carrington and Three
Other King's Mcsscngerss in which Lord Camden, in a celebrated
decision, declared illegal, at common law, the general warrants
issued by the Secretary of State, authorizing officers of the Crown
to enter and search any house where it might be suspected that
seditious libels were published; 4 and the court observed that the
Fourth Amendment was adopted in order to safeguard the people
against a recurrence of such practices under the new government.
The court concludes that to compel a person to produce in court his
private books and papers, is to accomplish in an indirect manner,
what the Fourth Amendment was designed to prevent.
This, it will be seen, was a very broad application of the provision against unreasonable searches and seizures, and, if strictly
adhered to would seriously restrict the usefulness of the subpwna
duces tecum; for if to compel a person to produce in court his private books and papers, to be used as evidence by the government,
is equivalent to an unreasonable search and seizure, it would seem
I iI6 U. S. 616 (885).
'Act June 22, I874 i8 Stat. i8,

Sec. s.

S9ig Howell's State Trials, io29 (1765).
' Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, 424-434 (7th Ed.).

NOTES

60

that to compel a person to produce, for similar purposes, papers of
a private nature of which he was custodian merely, would also be
equivalent to an unreasonable search and seizure. The courts,
however, have refused to carry the analogy so far, on the theory
that the right sought to be protected by the Fourth Amendment is
"the indefeasible right of personal security, personal liberty and
personal property," ' and that to compel a person, by use of the subpwna duces tccum, to ptoduce in court papers which are in his
lawful custody, but not his own private property, is not an invasion
of this right. Doubtless this conclusion was inspired by motives of
utility. But even the subpoena duces tecum must be reasonably
specific as to the papers and documents to be produced, and a subpwna commanding an officer of a corporation to produce in court
all of the contracts, correspondence, reports, accounts, etc., of the
corporation with" six other firms, is analogous to an unreasonable
search and seizure, because too general in its. terms, and is therefore void under the Fourth Amendment.*
If a person cannot be compelled to produce in Court, to be
used against himself, his private books and papers, because in violation of the immunities guaranteed by- the Fourth and Fifth Amend.
ments, one might suppose that if s uch books, papers and other evidence were actually procured by an illegal search and seizure, they
would not be permitted to be offered in evidence over the objection
of the person from whom they were taken; for in the "final result
it is of little practical difference to a person accused of any offense,
whether he be compelled himself to supply the evidence to be used
against him or whether such evidence is taken from him by an
agent of the government in an illegal search and seizure, and is then
used against him over his objection. In either case his constitutional rights are violated with the same disastrous result to himself.
Yet there are many decisions which hold that the wrongful or illegal means of obtaining evidence is alone no objection to its admissibility, if otherwise competent.'
There is, however, a well-recognized method by which a person
may prevent the introduction, in evidence against him, of books and
papers which have been acquired by an illegal search and seizure,
' Boyd v. United States,. supra, n.i.
"Hale v. Henkle, 201 U. S. 43 (t9o6).

It is also interesting to note

that the court, in a divided opinion, said: "While an individual may lawfully

refuse to answer incriminating questions unless protected by an immunity
statute, it does not follow that a corporation, vested with .special privileges

and franchises, may refuse to show its hand, when charged with an abuse
of such privilege," thereby suggesting that perhaps the immunities guaranteed
by the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, apply to natural persons only, and
not to corporations.
" Adams v. New York, 192 U. S. 585 (x9o4); Bacon v. United States,
97 Fed. Rep. 35 (1899); Trask v. People, 151 Ill. 523 (1894); Common-

wealth v. Dana, z Met. 329 (Mass. 184).
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and jhat is to petition the court for their return before the trial at
which they are intended to be introduced. It would seem that this
is carrying the maxim "to the diligent belongs the reward" very far;
and it suggests that a person may absolutely forfeit his substantive
rights, as guaranteed by the Constitution, through a delay or misapprehension as to the proper procedure to be taken in order to
protect those rights. In Weeks v. United States,' the court distinguishes Adams v. New York,'20 by pointing out that in the former
case the accused made "seasonable application" for a return of the
papers wrongfully seized, and that therefore the lower court erred
"in holding them and permitting their use upon the trial.""1 In LureYan v. United States,12 the court overruled the objection of the defendant to the admission in evidence of papers which had been
taken from him by an unlawful search and seizure, because, as the
court observes, "it does not appear that the plaintiff in error seriously resisted the search that was made." From this it might be
taken that a person's right to protection under the Constitution is
made to depend upon his physical prowess in resisting any encroachemnt of his rights.
The legal principle to be gathered from the cases seems to be
that if papers are taken by officials of the government, in an illegal
search and seizure, they may be recovered by petition to the court,
even though they contain evidence essential to the successful prosecution of an action against the one from whom taken. But if no
effort is made to recover such papers until the trial of the action, it
is no objection-to their admissibility that they were seized illegally
by the government. "3
E.L.H.

EQUITY-ENFORCEMENT

OF

DECREES-R mEDES

FOR

Dis-

oDEfIExcE-Punishment for contempt of the King's writ was the
original and characteristic feature of the processes of Court of
Chancery, and for disobedience to its decrees nothing could be done
but order the contumacious party to prison, there to remain until
he would obey.' A writ of attachment first issued against his per' Weeks v. United States, 232 U. S. 383 (194); United States v. Friedberg, 233 Fed. Rep. 313 (xx6).
'Supra, n. 8.
'Supra, n. 7.
"See also United States v. MeHie, T94 Fed. Rep. 894
United States v. McHie, t96 Fed. Rep. 586 (I9j2)

(1912),

and,

193 Fed. Rep. 97o (1912).
"The prohibition in the Fourth Amendment against unreasonable searches
and seizures, does not apply to the States. National Safe Deposit Co. v.
Stead. 232 U. S. s8 (1914).
'J. R. v. M. P. et al., Y. B. 37 H VI, Ames' Cases in Equity, r.

NOTES

son commanding the sheriff to bring him before the Chancellor to
answer for his contempt, and if he still refused obedience he might
then be lodged in jail indefinitely. That equity acted only .inpersonata was elementary. But the fact that other methods were soon
devised to enable equity to enforce its decrees, is ample proof that
the proceedings by way of contempt and imprisonment were not
always efficacious in securing real relief. The first step in what
might be called the earlier development of remedies for disobedience
of decrees was in the adaption of the writ of assistance, an ancient
possessory writ, to the needs of equity. If -the decree in a suit for
land required the defendant to deliver the possession to the plaintiff
and he refused to obey, the writ of assistance was used to put the
possession and keep him there. Another. method devised
plaintiff in"
by the court was the writ of sequestration, by means of which writ
the personal property of the defendant and the rents and profits of
his real property were sequestered and he was kept from their enjoyment until he cleared his contempt. The scope of this writ was
gradually widened, so that any property of the defendant could be
sequestered and not merely kept from him, but could also be sold to
satisfy the plaintiff's claim. While. the primary purpose of both
writs was indirectly to compel the defendant himself to perform the
decree, they provided, nevertheless, for specific execution of the decree independently of the act of the defendant. It can readily be
seen that for this reason they were bitterly opposed by the common
law courts, who saw in them an overstepping by equity of its jurisdiction in personam and an infringement of their own monopoly of
proceedings in rem.
In England, at the present day, the writ of assistance has been
superseded by the substantially similar writ of possession and is seldom, if ever, used to enforce obedience to a decree by a refractory
defendant. The writ of sequestration is used principally against a
corporation,2 and, in addition, an attachment for cbntempt may
issue against the directors or other officers to enforce obediehce?.
The ordinary procedure for compelling a recalcitrant defendant to
do any act other than the paymenf of money, or to refrain from
doing something, is by a writ of attachment or commital for contempt.' By statute, also, Chancery has been given permission to
act in "remin certain cases. Thus where a party refuses to obey a
decree for the execution of a conveyance or other instrument, the
court may appoint a master to make the conveyance or other instrument.s

'Stancomb v. Trowbridge Urban Council (Eng. 19o), 2 Ch. i9o.
189), 1 Ch. 671.
4Kerr on Injunctions, 684; D. v. A. & Co. (Eng. igoo), z Ch.488; Taylor
v. Plinston (Eng. 19ix), a Ch. 60&
'Act July V6. 183o. -Not long after, England adopted a more direct
' McKeown v. Joint Stock Institute, (Eng.

method and by its plan of "vesting orders" the court has power in a great
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In our own country attempts have been made by statutes to restrict the power of equity to enforce obedience to its decrees by
attachicnt and imprisonment for contempt, but with little success.
In a recent Pennsylvania decision, Commonwealth, ex rel., Licberum
v. Lewis.0 an injunction was issued against the defendant restraining him from continuing to obstruct a right of way of maintaining
a building thereon, and he was ordered to remove it.Upon his refusal to obey, he was committed to jail for contempt, the court
holding that the Act of June 16, I836, 7 regulating the power of the
several courts'of this commonwealth "to issue attachments and inflict summary punishment for contempts of court," has no relation
to attachments to enforce decrees in equity where the object is not to
"inflict punishment," but to compel performance of such decrees. Attachment and imprisonment for contempt has been used repeatedly
in Pennsylvania.' The court also considered at length the alternative
remedies existing in equity for the enforcement of its decrees against
a disobedient party, and it is'interesting to note that the old Chancery
writs, although seldom used, still exist in this State. The writ of
assistance, although having fallen into disuse in England, is still a
useful weapon in this country, 9 and the writ of sequestration is used
effectively in many cases.' 0 Both writs have been provided for by
the Pennsylvania rules of court." A bill to effectuate a decree has
been another method devised by the courts of equity in this country
to carry into effect their decrees.' 2 In addition, every State now has
a statute providing for a substantial and practical enforcement of a
decree for the execution of a conveyance or other instrument. Unlike the English statute, which, as we have seen, provides for the
appointment of a master to make the conveyance, the typical American statute provides that in case of non-performance by the de3
fendant, the decree recorded shall itself operate to transfer title.'
Curiously enough, the Pennsylvania statute of i9ol adopted the
English method. 1
many cases to vest the property in the successful litigant iust as effectively as

if the person so decreed had obeyed the decree. Act to extend provisions of
the Trustee Act. s & 16 Vict_'Chap. 5j(18o).

'98 At. 31 (Pa. x96).
'P. L. 793, Sec. 24.
'Chew's Appeal, 44 Pa. 247 (1863) ; Tome's Appeal, 50 Pa. 285 (1865);
Wilson v. Wilson, 142 Pa. 247 (i89i); Patterson v. Wyoming Valley, ec.,
fl ffl
31 Pa. Super. 112 (xgo6).
'Comm. ex rctl. Lowry v. Reed, 59 Pa. 425 (j868) ; Root v. Woolworth,
150 U. S.4ot (1893).
"Comm. cx reL Tyler v. Small, 26 Pa. 31 (1856) ; Hosack v. Rogers, zi
Paige 603 (N. Y. 1844).
" Rules 86 and 87.
"Winton's Appeal, 97 Pa. 385 (1881) ; Root v. Woolworth, supra, note 9.
" Statutes of this kind were enacted in America even before the English
Act of 183o. The earliest is that of Maryland in 1785.
"Act of April xg, igos, P. L 83.
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It will be seen from these statutes that the courts of equity have
made a marked departure from the fundamental idea that their.
jurisdiction is exclusively in personam when attempting to enforce
obedience to their decrees. The statutes are the result of the feeling which has been persistently growing, that equity itself should
have some method of enforcing and carrying out a decree which
an obstinate defendant has refused to perform. This tendency is
further illustrated by the new Equity Rule eight of the Supreme
Court of the United States, the latter part of which provides that:
"If a mandatory order, injunction, or decree for the specific performance of any act or contract be not complied with, the court or
a judge, besides or instead of, proceeding against the disobedient
party for a contempt or by sequestration, may by order direct that
the act required be done, so far as practicable by some other person
appointed by the court, at the cost of the disobedient party, and the
act, when so done, shall have like effect as if done by him.'' Turning for a moment to the Pennsylvania decision 19 before cited, it is
obvious that the case would have been far more effectively disposed
of had the court directed the building to be removed by some appointee of their own, in accordance with this rule, instead of allowing their hands to be tried by- the dogged contumacy of a defendant
who preferred jail to obedience to the decree. No legislation is
necessary to enable courts of equity to exercise this power of acting
through third parties at the cost of the disobedient defendant, since
it is a power inherent in all courts. It is hoped that the definite
recognition by our highest court of the existence of such a ppwer
will not only have a salutary effect upon the courts in blazing a way
for future judicial development, but may also result in a statutory
enactment expressly granting this power to courts of equity and
thereby satisfying even the most conservative tribunals.
P.H.R.
PROPERTY-DAMAGES FOR "SPIrE" WALL-The right to the full
and complete enjoyment of an absolute dominion over one's own
property has for ages been most jealously guarded by our legal system, and any attempt to encroach by legal means upon this right has
been met with instant and determined opposition. That when a
man owns property he owns to the heavens above and to the centre
of the earth below, and that within this rather definite region he
may do what he pleases so long as he does not violate the public law
or commit a nuisance, is insisted on as one of the essential attributes
of this absolute dominion. It is, therefore, interesting to note the

The English Rules of the Supreme Court, Order XLII, Sec. 3o provides practically the same thing.
"Supra, note 6.

-74

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

apparent change in legal sentiment with regard to this right, as
shown by the various statutes and many of the late cases dealing
with so-called "spite" fences. Although generally having their inception in trifling quarrels or petty hatreds, these cases bring out
the issue squarely, whether this absolute dominion is to exist for all
purposes, regardless of who may be injured by its exercise.
The recent case of Hibbardv. Haliday I is an excellent illustration of the view taken by a number of late cases and enacted into
law by many State statutes. The plaintiff had erected an apartment
building close to the dividing line between his property and the defendant's lots, with a dozen windows overlooking the lots owned by
the defendant. The declaration stated that the defendant thereupon erected and had since maintained a high brick wall along .the
boundary line, extending along the whole length of the plaintiff's
building and to within a few feet of its roof in height, and for no
other purpose than maliciously to injure the plaintiff in the enjoyment and use of his property. On demurrer the declaration was
held to state a cause of action, which ruling was affirmed by the
Supreme Court.
It is conc'eded that in all cases where the structure complained
of serves some useful or ornamental purpose, even though malice
may have been the predominating motive for its existence, the
owner of the property on which it rests is strictly within his rights
in erecting it, and whatever harm results to the other party is damnum absque injuria. Wherever an easement of light and air exists
or the dotrine of .ancient windows prevails, if a spite fence interferes there is no doubt as to the remedy. But in America, generally
these doctrines do not exist.
Before the opinion of Mr. Justice Morse, of the Michigan Supreme Court, in the case of Burke v. Stnith,2 the majority of courts
and the undoubted weight of authority favored the application of
the maxim cujus est solum ejus est usque as coelum to its fullest ex-

tent. They permitted the erection of spite fences, while deploring
the necessity to do so, on the ground that it would be an unwarranted interference with a person's right to the full enjoyment of
his own property, and insisted that the remedy, if any, should be
through legislation.2 But Mr. Justice Morse took the position that
1x58 Pac. xi18 (Okh. 19x6).
2 69 Mich. 38o 0888).

*Pickard v. Collins, 23 Barb. 458 (N. Y. i8s6) ; Levy v. Brothers, 4 Misc.
48 (N. Y. 1893); Mahan v. Brown, 13 Wend. 261 (N. Y. 1835), a leading
case; Lapere v. Iuckey, 23 Kan. 534 0i88o); Guest v. Reynolds, 68 I1. 478
(1873); Ransom v. McAlister, 9 Ky. L. Rep. 495 (1887); Letts v. Kessler,
5,4 Ohio St. 73 (896); Giller v. West, x62 Ind. 17 (9o4); Bordeaux v.
Green, 22 Mont. 254 (i899); Metzger v. Hochrein, 1o7 Wis. 267 (1goo), Criticising the Michigan cases severely as a judicial trespass on the legislative
authority.

NOTES

no man should have the right maliciously to injure his neighbor
under the guise of exercising a legal right, when his sole purpose in
exercising that right is to injure his neighbor and in no way to benefit himself or others.4 His opinion was given in a divided court and
did not become the law of Michigan until some time later, when it
was several times unanimously affirmed.- The opinion has been
quoted at length in almost every case following the view expressed
therein, and has probably determined the noticeable drift in opinion
in such cases, -toward a broader interpretation of the maxim sic
utcre tuo, ut alienum non laedas.9
A number of States have enacted statutes forbidding the erection
of "spite" fences where the sole motive for erection is to.spite or
injure the adjoining property owner and where the fence does not
benefit the builder either by way of protection, use or ornament7
The remedy under these statutes is generally by injunction, and in
proper cases penalties or damages are allowed. It is necessary that
malevolence be the predominating motive for its erection;' and that
the fence or wall be on the boundary line itself or very close to it.'
It is submitted that the position adopted by the principal case
and those like it, is the better view and does not involve any great
deprivation of legal rights, such as is feared by the ultra-conservative legalists.
T.L.H.
""But it must be remembered that no man has a legal right to
make a malicious use of his property, not for any benefit to himself, but for the avowed purpose of damaging his neighbor. To hold
othcrwise would make the law a convenient engine, in cases like the
present, to injure and destroy the peace and comfort, and to damage
the property, of one's neighbori" for no other than a wicked purpose,

which in itself is-or ought to be-unlawful.

The right to do this

cannot, in an enlightened country, exist either in the use of property

or in any way or manner." Mr. Justice Morse. in Burke v. Smith,
note 2, supra.
'Flaherty v. Moran, 81 Mich. 52 (089o); Kirkwood v. Finegan,
9S Mich. 543 (1893); Peek v. Roe, xIo Mich. 52 (1896).
'Rideout v. Knox, 148 Mass. 368 (1889); Barger v. Barringer, z5z
N. C. 433 (igo9); Norton v. Randolph, z76 Ala. 381 (1912); .Bush v.

Mocket, 95 Neb. 552 (1914); Metz v. Tierney, 13 N. M. 363 (9o6);
and the Michian cases in note c. suxpa
'
'California., Stat. x885, p. 45; Connecticut, Rev. St. z9o2, Sees. xo&3,
11o7; Maine, Rev. St., Chap. 22, See. 6; Massachusetts, Rev. Laws, 19o2,
Chap. 33, Sec. ig; New Hampshire, Pub. Stat. Chap. 143, Secs. 28, 29, 30;
Vermont, Pub. Stat., i9o6, Tit. 22. Chap. 179, Sec. 415o; Washington, Rem.
& Bal. Code, Sec. 720. 2 H. C. Sec. 26&
'Whitlock v. Uhle, 75 Conn. 423 (1903): Healey v. Spaulding, io4 Me.
T22 (1908); Rideout v. Knox, 148 Mass. 368 (889);
Karasek v. Peier, 22
Wash. 419 (19oo).
1 Ingwersen v. Barry, n8 Cal. 342 (1897); Brostrom v. Lauppe, syg Mass.

315 (1901).
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AND APPARENT-The
PROPERTY-EASEMENTS-CONTINUOUS
question of what constitutes a continuous and apparent easement
is one that has vexed the courts for a number of years. The confusion has arisen not so much in finding a definition-though even
in this respect the courts are far from unanimous-as in properly
classifying those uses or quasi easements, which, on a severance of
an estate, pass to the grantee or devisee, by way of implication and
become actual easements. This difficulty is well illustrated in a
recent case I in England. The owner of two adjoining villas, Bracton and Malta, in 1893, laid a pipe across the latter to supply the
former with water for drinking and garden purposes. The source
of the water was a well on the land of a third person. In 1894,

drinking water was obtained for Bracton Villa from a water company; but the pipe line was used for the garden, and had been so
used up to the time of this suit. The owner died in 1902, and the
devisee of Bracton leased to the plaintiff; while the devisee of Malta
sold it to the defendant, Cotton. Although there was a tank on the
grounds of Bracton, into which the water flowed, yet the new owner
of ,Malta seems to have been ignorant of the fact that the pipe ran
through his premises; and the well had been overgrown with weeds
for a number of years. In 1914, while laying out a new carriage
road, workmen discovered the pipe and on the orders of the defend.
ant, cut it. The plaintiff thereupon brought this suit, asking that

the pipe be restored and that the defendant be enjoined perpetually
from interfering with it, on the ground that it constituted an easemient which passed to the devisee, under the words, "of Bracton and
its appurtenances."
After a very thorough discussion of what easements pass by
implication, the court decided that this was of the class known as
"continuous and apparent," and that the plaintiff was right in his
contentions. That the court was correct as far as the continuousness
is concerned, there is little doubt. "The test of continuousness is,
that there is an alteration or arrangement of a tenement, which
makes one part of it dependent in some measure upon another. This
alteration or arrangement must be intended to be permanent in its
nature."2
There also - enters into the definitions the idea that it may be
enjoyed without the further necessity of human interference, once
3
it has been established, but there is a limitation on the doctrine that
has caused many diverse opinions-namely, the degree or necessity.
The general rule, as far as one exists, seems to make "reasonable"
necessity, or even convenience, the criterion;,' and this in cases of
114 Law Times 78o (19t6).
'Jones, Easements, Sec. 143.
'Fetters v. Sumphreys, i8 N. J. Eq. 260 (1867), at p. 262; Washburn,
Easements, 2d Ed. p. *13.
'Nicholas v. Chamberlain, Croc. Jac. T21 (16o7); Watts v. Kelson, L. R.
6 Ch. App. 166 (1871); Tiffany, Real Property, Sec. 317.

'Schwann v. Cotton & Hayles,

NOTES

continuous and apparent easements. Combining these ideas,' it
might be said that a continuous easement, reasonably necessary, will
pass by implication. It should be noted, however, that at least two
jurisdictions, Massachusetts and Maine, hold that there must be a
strict necessity, regardless of whether the easement is continuous or
not."
What easements, then, are considered "continuous"? A complete enumeration would be impossible with any hope of universal
approval, but there are some about which there is little, if any doubt:
" . . the best of a running stream, an overhanging roof, a pipe
for conveying water, a drain, or a sewer." 6 It will be noted -that
rights of way are omitted; this is generally true, they being.classed
as "non-continuous," and a distinction being made between the two
classes.7 There seems to be a tendency, however, to regard this distinction with some disfavor, and to put the implied creation on
another ground than mere continuousness. This is evidenced in a
number of cases,8 although more or less in the way of dictum. If
the doctrine indeed rests on the supposed intention of the grantor,$
this distinction should be abandoned. Speaking of the doctrine of
easements by implication in Dalton v. Angus, 0 Lord Blackburn
said:
"Those who framed the Code Napoleon had to make one law
for all France. To facilitate this task, they divided servitudes into
classes, those that were continuous and those that were discontinuous, and those that were apparent and non-apparent (Code Civil.
Arts., 688, 689).1t1 Those divisions and the definitions were, as far
'Buss v. Dyer, 125 Mass. 287 (878) ; Stevens v. Orr, 69 Me. 323 (x879);
Washburn, Easements, pp. io8 and log.
' Fetters v. Humphreys. sutra.
'Polden v. Bastard, L. R. x Q. B. 156 (1865); Boone, Real Property%,-

Vol. II, Sec. 3o6; Washburn, Easements, p. ios, et seq.

* Ewart v. Cochrane, 5 Law Times x (1861); Bayley v. Great Western
it p. 452; Martin v. Murphy, 221 IlL 632
(igo6).
Morrison v. Marquardt, 24 Ia. 35 (x867).
L_ R. 6 App. Cas. 74o (i88t), at p. 821.
"Code Napoleon. Art. 688: "Les servitudes ou sont continues, on discontinues. Les servitudes continues sont celles dont l'usage est on peut
tre continuel sans avoir besoin du fait actuel de V'homme: tels sont les
conduites d'eau, les igouts, les vues et autres de cette esp&e. Les servitudes
discontinues sont celles Qui ont besoin de fait actuel de li'homme pour atre
exercies: tels sont les droits de passage, puisage, pacage et autres seneblables." Art. 689: "Les servitudes sont apparentes, ou non apparentes. Les
servitudes apparentes sont celles qui s'annoncent par des ouvrages extkieurs,
tels qu'une porte, une fen~tre. un aqueduc. Les servitudes non apparentes
sont celles qui n'ont pas de signe extirieurs de leur existence, conme, par
exemple, la prohibition de bitir sur un fonds, ou de ne bitir qu'i une
hauteur dtermine." While it does not affect the seeming disapproval of
these distinctions to be found in Lord Blackburn's opinion, yet it must be
noted that they do occur prior to the Code Napolion. Merlin, Ripertoire
Ry., L. R. 26 Ch. Div. 434 (884),
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as I can observe, perfectly new; for though the difference between
the things must always have existed, I cannot find any trace of the
distinction having been taken in the old French law, and it is certainly not to be found in any English law authority before Gale on
Easements in 1839."
\Vhile not actually denying the distinction, it would seem that
Lord Blackburn disapproved of it. In a comparatively recent
American case,1 2 the court notes that the distinction is borrowed
from the civil law and criticizes it rather severely. It is interesting
to note that in Pennsylvania the earlier cases make no distinction on
these grounds between rights of way and other easements more
strictly continuous.' 3 Their decisions are based on the assumption
that a right of way may be perfectly open and pernianent; and the
doctrine is summarized by Justice Thompson as follows:
"It is not to be. uuderstood by this doctrine, that any temporary
convenience, adopted by the owner of property is within it. By all
the authorifics it is confined to cases of servitudes of a permanent
nature, notorious, or plainly visible, and from the character of which
it may be presumed that the owner was desirous of their preservation as servitudes, evidently necessary to the convenient enjoyment
of the property to which they belong, and not for the purposes
of mere pleasure." 14
This view has been somewhat modified by a later case,' which
classes a right of way as a non-continuous easement, but admits that
it may pass by implication-aside from a way of necessity-under
proper circumstances, though deprecating the further extension Of
the doctrine of the earlier cases.
universel et raisonni de Jurisprudence, Sth Ed., Vol. XXXI, p. 46, also notes
the distinctions between "servitudes visibles" and "servitudes cachies,"
"servitudes continues" and "servitudes discontinues"; and again on pp. 5o
and 5j. he enters into a more minute description of these servitudes and
their characteristics. In Brodeau's Commentary on La Coutume de Paris,
Vol. II. top of p. 498, there is mention of the various easements: "Mais
cette distinctions est inutile, par ce que la Coutume, soit l'ancienne on
novuelle, requiert titre, sans lcquel cie rejete indifferemment la prescription
en toute sorte de Servitudes. uibanes et rurales, continues et perpetuelles,
ou discontinues ct interrompues, soil visibles et apparentes, ou occultes et
latentes. . . ." And in Vol. II of de Ferriere's commentary on the same
body of law. p. T541, reference is made to La Coutume d'Anjou, Art. 454,
where the distinction is mentioned. In addition, Denisart, Collection de
)&cisions nouvelles et de Notions Relatives i la Jurisprudence actuelle, Vol.
IV. p. 393. reports a case in.1756, which refers to a "servitude apparente."
From these sources it would appear that the framers of the Code Napolion
did not invent the distinctions, as intimated by Lord Blackburn, but based
the two articles in question, upon certain of the customary laws and upon
distinctions originated by the courts.
"Baker v. Rice, 56 Ohio St. 463 (1897), at p. 477.
" Phillips v. Phillips, 48 Pa. 178'(1864); Overdeer v. Updegraff, 69 id.
110 (1871).

" Phillips v. Phillips, jupra, at p. i85.
"Francies's Appeal, 96 Pa. 200 (sSMo); Washburn, Easements, p. 110.

NOTES
There remains to be considered the question of "apparent" as
raised in the principal case. There are not a few decisions which
go so far as to say that to be "apparent" the easement must be perfectly obvious and visible; and some of them directly classify drains
When the nature of such easements is conas "non-apparent.""
sidered, however, it would appear that the cases which put a less
strict interpretation on "apparent," are more logical." These cases
probably represent the great weight of authority t8 and moreover
appeal to one's sense of justice. The court in the principal case
seems to have been greatly influenced by the language in Pyer v.
Carter," and Wheeldon v. Burrows.20 Justice Astbury says at the
conclusion of the .opinion: "If, in a case like the present . . . it
is necessary in implying a grant of an easement for it to be 'apparent' as well as continuous, the expression in my judgment meanor includes easements 'apparent' on the premises granted." This is
at least an ingenious definition to fit the facts of the case; and it
seems authorized by the language of the earlier cases!' Indeed, an
American jurist,22 has resolved the difficulty in much the same way.
saying, "The easements which he (.the grantee) sees on the tenement that he buys, must be held to be apparent." There is this flaw
in both definitions: that the existence of the easement is made to
depend on something visible on the dominant tenement, rather than
on the servient; and in the American case, it is said in so many
words that the easement is on the dominant tenement. Of course.
these are technical objections; but they go to show the difficulties
facing a court in determining the meaning of "apparent." These
objections are obviated by following a definition which makes the
terms "continuous" and "apparent" practically synonymous. "All
continuous or apparent easements-in other words, all easements
necessary to the reasonable enjoyment of the premises granted, and
which have been and are at the time of the grant used by the owner
of the entirety for the benefit of the part granted-will pass to the
It is to be noted that practically, and
grantee under the grant."2
"Carbrey v. Willis, 7 Allen 364 (Mass. 1863); Sellers v. Texas C. R.
Co., 81 Tex. 458 (8gi) ; Scott v. Beutel, 23 Grattan t (Va. 1873).
"Seymour v. Lewis, 13 N. J. Eq. 439 (1861); Kelly v. Dunning, 43 id.
62 (1887); and the principal case.
"Gale, Easements, 9th Ed., p. 114; Tiffany, Real Property, See. 317.
" H. & Norm. g16 (Eng. 1857). For an interesting discussion of the
authority of this case cf. Washburn, Easements, p. , et seq. In Suffield
v. Brown, 1o Jur., N. S., iit (Eng. 1864), the court went out of its way to
attack the decision in Pyer v. Carter; but in Ewart v. Cochrane, supre, it
was expressly approved.

41 Law Times 327 (1879).
" Pyer v. Carter, supra, and Wheeldon v. Burrows, supra.
n

'IV. C. Pitney in Larsen v. Peterson, 53 N. J. Eq. 88 (1894), at p. 93;
cf. also Jones, Easements, Sec. 149.
' Boone, Real Property. Vol. 1, Sec. t4o. This definition is practically
a quotation from Lord Justice Thesiger in Wheeldon v. Burrows, supra.
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taking the words in their literal sense, this definition could include
the so-called "non-continuous" easements, whenever the latter were
"necessary to the reasonable enjoyment of the premises." Aside
from that, however, its principal advantage would appear to be
the e:phasizing of "continuous" rather than "apparent," thereby
avoiding difficulties which occur in connection with the latter.
R.T.B.

MASTER AND SERVANT-WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION AcrINJURIES ARISING' IN THE COURSE OF THE EMPLOYMENT-The

various terms which have been used in compensation acts to delimit
the precise scope of a workman's employment have proved fruitful sources of litigation. A large number of the cases decided under the English Act seek to define the phrase, "personal injury by
accident arising out of or in the course of his employment," almost
every word of which has been under repeated fire in the courts.
Nor do most of the American statutes seem to have clarified the
law on this point'
In a very recent case 2 a plumber's assistant was found dead on
the road hear his employer's wagon, with which he had started to
work. The head and shoulders of the deceased were covered with
cuts and bruises; death had been caused by a hemorrhage of the
brain. Upon these facts the Committee of Arbitration found that
2
the deceased had met his death in the course of his employment.
4
be
reonly
to
Industrial
Board
The decision was affirmed by the
versed by the Supreme Court. 5
'Western Indemnity Co. v. Pillsbury, I51 P. 398 (Cal. 1915); Spooner
v. Saturday Night Co., 153 N. W. 657 (Mich. Igx5); Klavinsky v. Lake
Shore and M. S. Ry. Co., 152 N. W. 213 (Mich. i915); Rongo v. Waddington
& Sons, 87 N. J. L. 395 (1915); Smith v. Price, T53 N. Y. S. 22n, x68 App.
Div. 42x (i9's); Moore v. Lehigh Valley Ry. Co, x54 N. Y. S. 62o, x69
App. Div. 177 (x915).
,In re Sanderson's Case, 113 N. E. 355 (Mass. I916).
"'The Committee further found: 'That there Wis no direct evidence
tending to show how or in what manner Sanderson fell from the wagon.
There was no positive evidence as to whether the hemorrhage did occur
before or after the fall from the wagon, but from the circumstances as
disclosed by all the evidence, we find as a fact that Sanderson either fell
or was thrown from his wagon while he was in the employ of Black . . .
and that the black and blue spots were made by the fall.'

. . ." In re

Sanderson's Case, supra.
""The weight of all the evidence showed that he was thrown by an
accident and not by a stroke of apoplexy or other natural causes; and that
he was thrown from the wagon by the sudden moving or starting of the
horse. . . ." In re Sanderson's Case, supra.
I'While there was ample evidence from which it could have been found
that so far as could be ascertained, the employee was in a normal and
healthy condition, without any impairment of his arteries or disease of any

NOTES

No wording of a statute can resolve the narrow question of
fact-or inference based upon a fact, presented in such cases. The.
principle of stare decisis can rarely be invoked, and until a court of
last resort has spoken, the result must be'doubtful.
.An essentially similar problem arose early in the law of
agency. In one of the early cases 6 the decision turned on whether
a servant had acted within his authority. The court after discussing
the point at length., finally affirmed by the action of the trial court
in holding that ih'a close case the question was for the jury. The
cases upon this point are limitless and there has been resort to many
rules to cover the ever-varying concatenation of circumstances.'Many of the modern decisions grapple with the problem, but in adoubtful case ' it is usually asserted that the question is for the
jury. With this statement the common law started in 1834; therewith it has ended in 1916.
The point to be noted is not that litigation is more difficult in
these cases, but that only by litigation and the decision of the highest
court, can they be settled at all. The question, when an employee is
within the scope of his employment, or when an injury can be said
to arise out of the employment, has become one of increasing frequentcy and importance under the- various compensation acts. The
purpose of these acts has been judicially expressed :10
"As an endeavor to provide a way by which employer and employee may, if they so choose, escape entirely from that troublesome
and economically absurd luxury, known as 'personal injury litigation,' and resort to a system by which every employee not guilty
of wilful misconduct may receive at once a reasonable recompense
for injuries accidentally received in his employment under ccrtain
fixed rules, without a law suit and without friction.""1
of the organs of his body. and that it was unusual for a man of his age
to suffer a cerebral hemorrhage unaccompanied by some physical injury,
still, there seems to have been an entire absence of evidence to show that
the hemorrhage was caused by the fall from the wagon. It could have been
found that the blow upon the head was sufficiently severe to have caused
the hemorrhage, but there is no evidence to 'show that such injury did
produce the hemorrhage. . . " In re Sanderson's Case, supra.
'M'Kenzie v. M'Leod, io Ding. 385 (Eng. 1834).
"'The question is whether the finding of the jury was correct under
the direction of the chief justice that the defendant was not liable unless
the injury was occasioned by something done withii the scope of the
servant's duty. Now the words. 'the setvant's duty.' may convey several
meanings. They may mean cases where the duty is defined- by precise orders;
or where something is directed to he done, and the manner of doing it is
left wholly in the discretion of the servant, or where the manner of doing
it is only partly left in his discretion." Per Alderson, J.
' See Labatt: "Master and Servant" (2d Ed.), Vol. 6, p. 685i if.
'Cf. McDermott v. Grifliths, i9o 11. App. 53 (jot5).
"Chief-Justice Winslow in Borgnis v. Falk Company, 147 Wis. 327,
337 (1g1).
11The italics are the writer's.
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If such be the purpose of the act the large number of cases
which are indeterminable until passed upon by the highest court,
constitute a serious menace to its successful operation.
The effect of most of the acts 12 as exemplified by the Sanderson case has been merely to substitute the conjecture of a commission for the conjecture of a jury, leaving the result conjectural until
passed on by the Supreme Court. The Pennsylvania Act of 19x5
has sought to avoid the notorious vagueness 13 of its predecessors,
notably the English Act, by extended definition. 14 The result seems
to have justified the expectations of its framers. While a number
of litigable questions have arisen, which are not expressly covered
by the act and must be decided in each particular case by an accelerated common-law procedure, ' - the problem of exactly what injuries merit compensation seems to be met in almost every instance
by the express provisions of the statute. 16 Such questions were raised
in nearly one-half of the cases that arose under the act during the
last ten months, exclusive of those settled by agreement between
the parties. In most of these every doubt was resolved by reference
to the words of the act. 7 But though the act has gone far, too far
it is submitted,18 in order to reduce to certainty the injuries which
fall within its beneficial provisions, there still remains a number of
cases, not inconsiderable, whose speedy adjustment seems hopeless.' 9 In these the act has provided a more summary procedure,"
but the human equation which makes such a case doubtful until
passed on by the Supreme Court, still remains. To that extent the
uncertainties and delays of the old system still exist.
"The Acts of California and Wisconsin provide for the compensation
of all injuries growing out of the employment, unless the injury was the
result of the wilful misconduct- of the injured employee. In most cases
an employee has a right of appeal from an adverse ruling of the administrative board to the highest court.
"See article by Francis H. Bohlen, entitled, "A Problem in the Drafting
of Workmen's Compensation Acts," 25 Harvard Law Review, 328-348 and
401-427.

" Art. 3, Sec. 3o, P. L738 (IgS).
'See Stanley v. Wethervill, 2 Dep. Rep. 2153 (1I6); Proper v. Union
Ice Co., 2 Dep. Rep. iioo (igx6).
"Cf. the definition of "contractor" in Sec. zo5.
"Cf. Ward v. Thompson, 2 Dep. Rep. So7; Maufler v. Brenner, 2 Dep.
Rep. 1234.

"Tomazezki v. Carnegie Steel Co., 2 Dep. Rep. 21-6. where compensation was awarded to dependents of an employee killed by lightning, apart
from whether his employment contributed in any way toward the accident.
" Murray v. Cunningham and Murray, 2 Dep. Rep. 2o43; Kruth v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.. 2 Dep. Rep. 2045. Cf. Roller v. Drueding Bros., 2 Dep.
Rep. 1236; Sawiskey v. Foederer, 2 Dep. Rep. 835, and Beaton v. Hess
Mfg. Co., 2 Dep. Rep. 845.
Cf. the power of the Compensation Board to dispense with the usual
rules of evidence, to enlist the services of a physician, etc.

NOTES
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Administrative efficiency has been the goal.of the framers .of
the act.2" To secure it the common-law defenses of "contributory
negligence," "assumption of risk," and "the fellow-servant rule"
were discarded. Economic consistency was cast aside. The economic theory underlying the Pennsylvania Act seems to have been
expressed by the Wisconsin Court: 22 "Personal injury losses inddent to industrial pursuits, as certainly as wages, are part of the
cost of production of those things essential to or proper for business consumption, and the more directly they are incorporated
therein, the less the enhancement.of the cost and the better for all." 2
If such is the economic basis of the act, and it is submitted that
only upon such basis can the various features of the act be reconciled, economic consistency was sacrificed in the quest for administrative efficiency by a provision refusing compensation for occupational diseases. - ' Yet because compensation is restricted to "injuries," and only to such "injuries" as are in a sense due to the employment, a large number of cases inherently litigable, and covered
by no fixed rule of law, still remain to hinder the rapid adjustment
of claims under the act.
Only by extending the Workmen's Compensation Act to cover
all injuries, in fine, by making it -an Industrial Insurance Act, can
such cases be avoided.2 3 Nor would such a far-reaching legal and
economic measure obviate every perplexing question of fact and
opinion. Mala fide claims for compensation, based upon pretended
injuries, would loom large to vex the administrator.
.It would seem therefore, that where a claim rests upon a disputed question of fact, litigation can be avoided only by entrusting
See address of Francis H. Bohlen before the Law Association of
Philadelphia, November iS,1912, p. 15 ff., printed by the Law Association of
Philadelphia.
' Borgnis v. Falk Co., supra, note 1o.
"See also, Frankel and Dawson, "Workmen's Insurance In Europe,"
p. 9; Henderson, "Industrial Insurance," p. 18, quoted by Boyd in "Workmen's Compensation," p. 43.
" Art. 3, Sec. 30,' supra, note 14.
' The economic basis of such a measure is obvious. Several of the
text writers have given as the basis of the Compensation Acts, an economic
theory which pertains to industrial and old age insurance. "The object of
giving an injured workman a cause of action for injuries is not only to
compensate the workman, especially in the case of death or total disability,
but principally to furnish some compensation to his dependents who might
become public charges when their means of support are cut off by such an
accident." "Workmen's Compensation," James H. Boyd, p. 58. On p. 59
it is stated: "The effect on the dependents is just the same whether the
cause 'of the injury was due to the negligence of the employee, to that of
the employer, or to the natural hazards oi the business." Or, it may be
added, whether the employee dies of typhoid fever. See also "State Insurance," A. F. Lewis, p. 7, for the sociological and economic argument for
such a measure.
'*Proper v. Union Ice Co., supra, note is.
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the ultimate decision of the point to an adminisrative officer. Such
seems to be the trend under the Pennsylvania Act. The decision of
a referee is accorded the weight of the verdict of a jury, and will be
reversed by the Compensation Board only when manifest error has
"
been niade. 7
B. IV.
'Cf. Desarno v. Del. and Lackawanna R. R.. 2 Dep. Rep. .jo. affirmed
in 2 Dep. Rep. z272: Calderwood v. Altoona, 2 Dep. ReP. 748. affirmed in
2 Dep. Rep. 1274; Agney v. Ginsburg, 2 Dep. Rep. 595, affirmed in 2 Dep.
Rep. 84&

